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Abstract. Identifying and resolving conflicts of interests is a key challenge when
designing autonomous agents. For example, such conflicts often occur when com-
plex information systems interact persuasively with humans and are in the future
likely to arise in non-human agent-to-agent interaction. We introduce a theoretical
framework for an empathic autonomous agent that proactively identifies potential
conflicts of interests in interactions with other agents (and humans) by consider-
ing their utility functions and comparing them with its own preferences using a
system of shared values to find a solution all agents consider acceptable. To illus-
trate how empathic autonomous agents work, we provide running examples and a
simple prototype implementation in a general-purpose programing language. To
give a high-level overview of our work, we propose a reasoning-loop architecture
for our empathic agent.
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1 Background and Problem Description
In modern information technologies, conflicts of interests between users and informa-
tion systems that operate with a high degree of autonomy (autonomous agents) are
of increasing prevalence. For example, complex web applications persuade end-users,
possibly against the interests of the persuaded individuals1. Given the prevalence of
autonomous systems will increase, conflicts between autonomous agents and humans
(or between different autonomous agent instances and types) can be expected to occur
more frequently in the future, e.g. in interactions with or among autonomous vehicles
in scenarios that cannot be completely solved by applying static traffic rules. Conse-
quently, one can argue for the need to develop empathic intelligent agents that consider
the preferences or utility functions of others, as well as ethics rules and social norms
when interacting with their environment to avoid severe conflicts of interests. As a sim-
ple example, take two vehicles (A and B) that are about to enter a bottleneck. Assume
they cannot enter the bottleneck at the same time. A and B can either wait or drive.
Considering only its own utility function, A might determine that driving is the best
action to execute, given that B will likely stop and wait to avoid a crash. However, A
should ideally assess both its own and B’s utility function and act accordingly. If B’s
1 E.g., research provides evidence that contextual advertisement influences how users process
online news [25]; social network applications have effectively been employed for political
persuasion (see for an example: [4].
ar
X
iv
:1
90
2.
07
78
1v
1 
 [c
s.M
A]
  2
0 F
eb
 20
19
2 T. Kampik et al.
utility for driving is considered higher than A’s, A can then come to the conclusion
that waiting is the best action. As A does not only consider its own goals, but also the
ones of B, one can regard A as empathic, following Coplan’s definition of empathy, as
“a process through which an observer simulates another’s situated psychological states,
while maintaining clear self–other differentiation” [12]. While existing literature covers
conflict resolution in multi-agent systems from a broad range of perspectives (see for
a partial overview: [2]), devising a theoretical framework for autonomous agents that
consider the utility functions (or preferences) of agents in their environment and use a
combined utilitarian/rule-based approach to identify and resolve conflicts of interests
can be considered a novel idea. However, existing multi-agent systems research can be
leveraged to implement core components of such a framework, as is discussed later.
In this chapter, we provide the following research contributions:
1. We create a theoretical framework for an empathic agent that uses a combination
of utility-based and rule-based concepts to compromise with other agents in its
environment when deciding upon how to act.
2. We provide a set of running examples that illustrate how the empathic agent works
and show how the examples can be implemented in a general-purpose programing
language.
3. We propose a reasoning-loop architecture for a generic empathic agent.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: in Section 2, we present a theoreti-
cal framework for the problem in focus. Then, we illustrate the concepts with the help
of different running examples and describe the example implementation in a general-
purpose programing language in Section 3. Next, we outline a basic reasoning-loop
architecture for the empathic agent in Section 4. In Section 5, we analyze how the
architecture aligns with the belief-desire-intention approach and propose an implemen-
tation using the Jason multi-agent development framework. Finally, we discuss how our
empathic agent concepts relate to existing work, propose potential use cases, highlight a
set of limitations, and outline future work in Section 6, before we conclude the chapter
in Section 7.
2 Empathic Agent Core Concepts
In this section, we describe the core concepts of the empathic agent. To allow for a
precise description, we assume the following scenario2:
– The scenario describes the interaction between a set of empathic agents {A0, ..., An}.
– Each interaction scenario takes place at one specific point in time, at which all
agents execute their actions simultaneously.
– At this point in time, each agent Ai(0 ≤ i ≤ n) has a finite set of possible ac-
tions Actsi := {Act0i , ..., Actmi }, resulting in an overall set of action sets Acts :=
{Acts0, ..., Actsn}. Each agent can execute an action tuple that contains one or
2 As we will explain later, the scenario and the resulting specification can be gradually extended
to allow for better real-world applicability.
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multiple actions. In each interaction scenario, all agents execute their actions si-
multaneously and receive their utility as a numeric reward based on the actions that
have been executed.
– The utility of an agent Ai is determined by a function ui of the actions of all agents.
The utility function returns a numerical value or null3:
ui := Acts0 × ...×Actsn → {null,−∞,R,∞}
The goal of the empathic agent is to maximize its own utility as long as no conflicts
with other agents arise. We define a conflict of interests between several agents as any
interaction scenario in which there is no tuple of possible actions that maximizes the
utility functions of all agents. I.e., we need to compare argmaxuA0 , ..., argmaxuAn
4.
Note that argmaxuAi returns a set of tuples (that contains all action tuples that yield the
maximal utility for agent Ai). For this, we create a boolean function c that the empathic
agent uses to determine conflicts between itself and other agents, based on the utility
functions of all agents:
c(uA0 , ..., uAn) :=
 true, if :argmaxuA0 ∩ ... ∩ argmaxuAn 6= {};
false, otherwise.
Considering the incomparability property of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility the-
orem [24], such a conflict can be solved only if a system of values exists that is shared
between the agents and used to determine comparable individual utility values. Hence,
we introduce such a shared value system. To provide a possible structure for this system,
we deconstruct the utility functions into two parts:
– An actions-to-consequences mapping (a function a2ci that takes the actions the
agents potentially decide to execute and returns a set of consequences (proposi-
tional atoms) Consqs := {Consq0i , ..., Consqni }):
a2ci := Actsi × ...×Actsn → 2Consqs
– A consequences-to-utility mapping (utility quantification function uq). Note that
the actions-to-consequences mapping is agent-specific, while the utility quantifica-
tion function is generically provided by the shared value system5:
uq := 2Consqs → {null,−∞,R,∞}
3 We allow for utility functions to return a null value for action tuples that are considered im-
possible, e.g. in case some actions are mutually exclusive. While we concede that the elegance
of this approach is up for debate, we opted for it because of its simplicity.
4 The argmax operator takes the function it precedes and returns all argument tuples that max-
imize the function.
5 I.e., for the same actions, an agent should only receive a different utility outcome than another
agent if the impact on the two is distinguishable in its consequences. We again allow for null
values to be returned in case of impossible action tuples.
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Then, agents can agree on the utility value of a given tuple of actions, as long as the
quality of the consequence is observable to all agents in the same way. In addition, the
value system can introduce generally applicable rules, e.g. to hard-code a prioritization
of individual freedom into an agent. With help of the value system, we create a prag-
matic definition of a conflict of interests as any situation, in which there is no tuple
of actions that is regarded as acceptable by all agents when considering the shared set
of values, given each agent executes the actions that maximize their individual utility
function. To support the notion of acceptability, we introduce a set of agent-specific
acceptability functions accs := {accA0 , ..., accAn}. The acceptability functions are de-
rived from the corresponding utility functions and the shared system of values and take
a set of actions as their inputs. Acceptability functions are domain-specific and there is
no generic logic to be described in this context:
accAi := ActsA0 × ...×ActsAn → {null, true, false}
The notion of acceptability rules adds a normative aspect to the otherwise consequen-
tialist empathic agent framework. Without this notion, our definition of a conflict of
interests would cover many scenarios that most human societies regard as not conflict-
worthy, e.g. when one agent would need to accept large utility losses to optimize its
own actions towards improving another agents’ utility. Considering the acceptabil-
ity functions, we can now determine whether a conflict of interests in terms of the
pragmatic definition approach exists for an agent Ai by using the following func-
tion cp that takes the utility function ui of agent Ai and the acceptability functions
Accs := {accA0 , ..., accAn} as input arguments:
cp(ui, Accs) := true, if :@acts ∈ argmaxui ∧ ∀acc∈Accs : acc(acts) = true
false, otherwise.
We define an empathic agent Ai as an agent that, when determining the actions it exe-
cutes, considers the utility functions of the agents it could potentially affect and max-
imizes its own utility only if doing so does not violate the acceptability function of
any other agent; otherwise it acts to maximize the shared utility of all agents (while
also considering the acceptability functions)6. Algorithm 1 specifies an initial, naive
approach towards the empathic agent core algorithm. The empathic agent core algo-
rithm of an agent Ai in its simplest form can be defined as a function that takes the
utility functions {u0, ..., un} of the different agents, the set of all acceptability func-
tions Accs := {acc0, ..., accl}, and all possible actions Actsi of agent Ai and returns
the tuple of actions Ai should execute7.
6 As different aggregation approaches are possible (for example: sum, product) to deter-
mine the maximal shared utility, we introduce the not further specified aggregation function
aggregate(u0, ..., un). In our running examples (see Section 3), we use the product of the in-
dividual utility function outcomes to introduce some notion of fairness; inequality should not
be in the interest of the empathic agent. However, the design choice for this implementation
detail can be discussed.
7 To facilitate readability, we switch to a pseudo-code notation for the following algorithms.
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Algorithm 1 Naive empathic agent algorithm: D A N (determine actions naive)
1: procedure D A Ni({u0, ..., un}, Accs,Actsi) . Utility & acceptability functions of all
agents, actions of Ai(0 ≤ i ≤ n)
2: if ∃acts ∈ argmaxui ∧ ∀acc∈Accs : acc(acts) = true then
3: best acceptable acts← ⋃
acts∈argmaxui
: ∀acc∈Accsacc(acts) = true
4: return Actsi ∩ first(actsk ∈ best acceptable acts)
5: else
6: return Actsi ∩ first(argmax(aggregate(u′0, ..., u′n))
7: end if
8: end procedure
Note that in the context of the empathic agent algorithms, the function first(set) turns
the provided set of tuples into a sequence of tuples by sorting the elements in decreasing
alphanumerical order and then returns the first element of the sequence. This enables a
deterministic action tuple selection. Moreover, we construct a set of new utility func-
tions {u′0, ..., u′n} that assign all not acceptable action tuples a utility of null (Algo-
rithm 2)8:
Algorithm 2 Helper function: new utility function based on ui; all not acceptable action
tuples yield utility of null.
1: procedure u′i(ui, {acts0, ..., actsn}, accs)
2: is acceptable← ∀ acc ∈ accs : acc(actsi) = true
3: if is acceptable then
4: return ui(actsi, ..., actsn)
5: else
6: return null
7: end if
8: end procedure
In Algorithm 1, we specify that the agent picks the first item in the sequence of
determined action tuples if it finds multiple optimal tuples of actions. Alternatively,
the agent could employ one of the following approaches to select between the optimal
action tuples:
– Random. The agent picks a random action tuple from the list of the tuples it deter-
mined as optimal. This would require empathic agents to use an additional protocol
to agree on the action tuple that should be executed.
– Utilitarian. Among the action tuples that were determined as optimal, the agent
picks the one that provides maximal combined utility for all agents and falls back
to a random or first-in-sequence selection between action tuples if several of such
tuples exist.
8 We already use null to denote impossible action tuples. This implies an acceptable action tuple
should always exists. To achieve a distinction, a value of −∞ could be assigned.
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Still, the algorithm is somewhat naive, as agents that implement it will decide to execute
suboptimal activities if the following conditions apply:
– Multiple agents find that the actions that optimize their individual utility are incon-
sistent with the actions that are optimal for at least one of the other agents.
– Multiple agents find that executing these conflicting actions is considered accept-
able.
– Executing these acceptable actions generates a lower utility for both agents than
optimizing the shared utility would.
Hence, we extend the algorithm so that the agent selects the tuple of actions that maxi-
mizes its own utility, but falls back to maximize shared utility if the utility-maximizing
action tuple is either not acceptable, or would lead to a lower utility outcome than
maximizing the shared utility, considering the other agent follows the same approach
(Algorithm 3):
Algorithm 3 Lazy empathic agent algorithm: D A L (determine actions lazy)
1: procedure D A Li({u0, ..., un}, Accs) . Utility & acceptability functions of all agents,
actions of all agents {A0, ..., An}
2: {acts max0, ..., acts maxn} ← DETERMINE ACT MAX(ui, Accs)
3: {good acts max0, ..., good acts maxn} ← {
4: DETERMINE GOOD ACTS MAX(u0, Accs, acts max0),
5: ...,
6: DETERMINE GOOD ACTS MAX(un, Accs, acts maxn),
7: }
8: if good acts max0 ∩ ... ∩ good acts maxn 6= {} then
9: return Actsi ∩ first(good acts max)
10: else
11: return Actsi ∩ first(argmax(aggregate(u′0, ..., u′n)))
12: end if
13: end procedure
Algorithm 3 calls two helper functions. Algorithm 4 determines acceptable action tu-
ples that maximize a provided utility function ui:
Algorithm 4 Helper function: determine acceptable action tuples that maximize utility
function ui
1: procedure DETERMINE ACT MAX(ui, Accs)
2: return
⋃
acts∈argmaxui
: ∀acc∈Accsacc(acts) = true
3: end procedure
Algorithm 5 determines all action tuples that would maximize an agent’s (Ai’s) utility
if this agent could dictate the actions of all other agents, given the action tuples provide
Empathic Autonomous Agents 7
a better utility for this agent than the action tuples that maximize all agents’ combined
utility, given all agents execute an action tuple that maximizes their own utility if they
could dictate the other agents’ actions. Note that Algorithm 5 makes use of the previ-
ously introduced algorithm (Algorithm 1):
Algorithm 5 Helper function: determines all maximizing action tuples that would still
yield a good utility result for agent Ai(0 ≤ i ≤ n), given all other agents also pick an
action tuple that would maximize their own utility, if all other agents “played along”.
1: procedure DETERMINE GOOD ACTS MAX(ui, Accs)
2: return
⋃
acts∈argmaxui
: ∀acc∈Accs : acc(acts) = true ∧
3: ui(
n⋃
k=0
D A Nk({u0, ..., un}, Accs, acts))
4: ≥ ui(acts max)
5: end procedure
However, this algorithm only considers two types of action tuples for execution: action
tuples that provide the maximal individual utility for the agent and action tuples that
provide the maximal combined utility for all agents. Action tuples that do not maximize
the agent’s individual utility, but are still preferable over the action tuples that maximize
the combined utility, remain unconsidered. Consequently, we call an agent that imple-
ments such an algorithm a lazy empathic agent. We extend the algorithm to also consider
all action tuples that could possibly be relevant. I.e., if an action tuple is not considered
acceptable, or if the tuple is considered acceptable but the agent chooses to not execute
it, the agent falls back to the tuple of actions that provides the next best individual util-
ity. We construct a function ne that returns the Nash equilibria based on the updated
utility functions {u′0, ..., u′n}, considering we have a strategic game 〈N, (Ai) %i〉, with
N := {A0, ...An}, Ai := ActsAi , and acts %i acts′ := u′i(acts) ≥ u′i(acts′)9.
Then, we create the full empathic agent core algorithm D A Fi for an agent Ai that
takes the updated utility functions {u′0, ..., u′n} and all agents’ possible actions as in-
puts {Acts0, ..., Actsn}. The algorithm determines the (first of) the Nash equilibria
that provide the highest shared utility and, if no Nash equilibrium exists, chooses the
first tuple of actions that maximizes shared utility:
9 See the Nash equilibrium definition provided by Osborne and Rubinstein [19, p. 11 et sqq.].
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Algorithm 6 Full empathic agent algorithm: D A F (determine actions full)
1: procedure D A Fi({u′0, ..., u′n}, {Acts0, ..., Actsn})
2: equilibria← ne({u′0, ..., u′n}, {Acts0, ..., Actsn})
3: if equilibria 6= {} then
4: shared max equilibria← acts∗ ∈ equilibria :
5: ∀acts ∈ equilibria :
6: (u′0(acts∗)× ...× u′n(acts∗)) ≥ (u′0(acts)× ...× u′n(acts))
7: return Actsi ∩ first(shared max equilibria)
8: else
9: return Actsi ∩ first(argmax(aggregate(u0, ..., un))
10:
11: end if
12: end procedure
Going back to the selection between several action tuples that might be determined
as optimal, it is now clear that a deterministic approach for selecting a final action tuple
is preferable for both lazy and full empathic agents, as it avoids agents deciding upon
executing action tuples that are not aligned with one another and lead to an unnecessary
low utility outcome. Hence, we propose using a utilitarian approach with a first-in-
sequence selection if the utilitarian approach is inconclusive10.
The proposed agent can be considered a rational agent following the definition by
Russel and Norvig in that it “acts so as to achieve the best outcome or, when there is
uncertainty, the best expected outcome” [22, p. 4-5] and an artificially socially intelli-
gent agent as defined by Dautenhahn as it instantiates “human-style social intelligence”
in that it “manage[s] the individual’s [its own] interests in relationship to the interests
of the social system of the next higher level” [13].
3 Running Examples
In this section, we present two simple running examples of empathic agents and de-
scribe the implementation of the examples in a general-purpose programming language
(JavaScript).
3.1 Example 1: Vehicles
We provide a running example for the “vehicle/bottleneck” scenario introduced above.
Consequently, we have a two-agent scenario {A,B}. Each agent has a utility function
uA,B := ActsA × ActsB → {−∞,R,∞}. ActsA and ActsB are the possible actions
A and B, respectively, can execute. To fully specify the utility functions, we follow the
approach outlined above and first construct the actions-to-consequences mappings a2cA
and a2cB for both agents. The possible actions are ActsA = {driveA, waitA} and
ActsB = {driveB , waitB}. I.e., Acts = {driveA, waitA, driveB , waitB}. To assess
10 As state above, we assume that the first function sorts the action tuples in a deterministic
order before returning the first element.
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the consequences that include waiting, we assume B is twice as fast as A (without
waiting, A needs 20 time units to pass the bottleneck while B needs 10)11:
a2cA(acts) :=

crash, if : acts = (driveA, driveB);
wait 0, if : acts = (driveA, waitB);
wait∞, if : acts = (waitA, waitB);
wait 10, if : acts = (waitA, driveB);
null, otherwise.
a2cB(acts) :=

crash, if : acts = (driveA, driveB);
wait 20, if : acts = (driveA, waitB);
wait∞, if : acts = (waitA, waitB);
wait 0, if : acts = (waitA, driveB);
null, otherwise.
We construct the following utility quantification functions and subtract an amount pro-
portional to the waiting time from the utility value 1 of wait 0:
u2cA(consqs) :=

−∞, if : consqs = {crash};
0.9, if : consqs = {wait 20};
0 if : consqs = {wait∞};
1, if : consqs = {wait 0},
null, otherwise.
u2cB(consqs) :=

−∞, if : consqs = {crash};
0.8, if : consqs = {wait 20};
0, if : consqs = {wait∞};
1, if : consqs = {wait 0};
null, otherwise.
Actions-to-consequences mappings and utility quantification functions can then be com-
bined to utility functions:
uA(acts) =

1, if : acts = (driveA, waitB);
0.9, if : acts = (waitA, driveB);
0, if : acts = (waitA, waitB);
−∞, if : acts = (driveA, driveB);
null, otherwise.
uB(acts) =

0.8, if : acts = (driveA, waitB);
1, if : acts = (waitA, driveB);
0, if : acts = (waitA, waitB);
−∞, if : acts = (driveA, driveB);
null, otherwise.
11 driveA ∧ waitA and driveB ∧ waitB , respectively, are mutually exclusive ({driveA ⊕
waitA, driveB ⊕ waitB}, with A ⊕ B := (A ∨ B) ∧ ¬(A ∧ B)). I.e., the functions re-
turn null if driveA ∧ waitA ∨ driveB ∧ waitB .
10 T. Kampik et al.
We assume scenarios where both agents are driving or both agents are waiting are not
acceptable by either agents and introduce the corresponding acceptability rules:
accA,B(acts) :=false, if : acts = (driveA, driveB) ∨ (waitA ∧ waitB);null, if : (driveA ∈ acts ∧ waitA ∈ acts) ∨ (driveB ∈ acts ∧ waitB ∈ acts);
true, otherwise.
Based on the utility functions (uA, uB), we create new utility functions (u′A, u
′
B) that
consider the acceptability rules:
u′A(acts) :=

1
2 , if : acts = (driveA, waitB);
1
3 , if : acts = (waitA, driveB);
null, otherwise.
u′B(acts) :=
 1, if : acts = (waitA, driveB);13 , if : acts = (driveA, waitB);
null, otherwise.
Finally, we apply the empathic agent algorithms to our scenario. Using the naive al-
gorithm, the agents apply the acceptability rules, but do not consider the other agent’s
strategy. Hence, both agents decide to drive, (and consequently crash).
D A NA({u′A, u′B , }, {accA, accB}, ActsA) = driveA
D A NB({u′A, u′B , }, {accA, accB}, ActsB) = driveB
The resulting utility is −∞ for both agents. None of the two other algorithms (lazy,
full) allows any agent to decide to execute an action tuple that does not optimize shared
utility. I.e., both algorithms yield the same result:
D A LA({u′A, u′B , }, {accA, accB}, ActsA) = waitA
D A LB({u′A, u′B , }, {accA, accB}, ActsB) = driveB
D A FA({u′A, u′B , }, {accA, accB}, ActsA) = waitA
D A FB({u′A, u′B , }, {accA, accB}, ActsB) = driveB
The resulting utility is 0.9 for agent A and 1 for agent B. As can be seen, the differ-
ence between agent types is not always relevant. The following scenario will provide a
distinctive outcome for all three agent variants.
3.2 Example 2: Concert
As a second example, we introduce the following scenario12. Two empathic agents
{A,B} plan to attend a concert of music by either Bach, Stravinsky, or Mozart (Acts :=
12 The scenario is an adjusted and extended version of the “Bach or Stravinsky? (BoS)” example
presented by Osborne and Rubinstein [19, p. 15–16]
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{BachA, StravinskyA,MozartA, BachB , StravinskyB ,MozartB}). A considers
the Bach and Mozart concerts of much greater pleasure when attended in company of B
(utility of 6, respectively 3) and not alone (either concert: 1). In contrast, the Stravinsky
concert yields good utility, even if A attends it alone (4). Attending it in company of B
merely gives a utility bonus of 1 (total: 5). B prefers concerts in company of A as well
(2 for Stravinsky and 4 for Mozart), but gains little additional utility from attending a
Bach concert with A (1.1 with A versus 1 alone) because they dislike listening to A’s
Bach appraisals. Attending any concert alone yields a utility of 1 for B. As the utility is
in this scenario largely derived from the subjective musical taste and social preferences
of the agents and to keep the example concise, we skip the actions-to-consequences
mapping and construct the utility functions right away13:
uA(acts) =

null, if : length(acts) 6= 2 ∨
length(set(BachA, StravinskyA,MozartA) ∩ set(acts)) 6= 1∨
length(set(BachB , StravinskyB ,MozartB) ∩ set(acts)) 6= 1;
6, else if : acts = (BachA, BachB);
5, else if : acts = (StravinskyA, StravinskyB);
4, else if : StravinskyA ∈ acts ∧ StravinskyB /∈ acts;
3, else if : acts = (MozartA,MozartB);
1, otherwise.
uB(acts) =

null, if : length(acts) 6= 2 ∨
length(set(BachA, StravinskyA,MozartA) ∩ set(acts)) 6= 1∨
length(set(BachB , StravinskyB ,MozartB) ∩ set(acts)) 6= 1;
1.1, else if : acts = (BachA, BachB);
2, else if : acts = (StravinskyA, StravinskyB);
4, else if : acts = (MozartA,MozartB);
1, otherwise.
We introduce the following acceptability function that applies to both agents (although
it is of primary importance for agent A). As agent A is banned from the venue that hosts
the Stravinsky concert, the action StravinskyA is not acceptable:
accA,B(acts) :={
false, if : acts = StravinskyA ∈ acts;
true, otherwise.
13 Note that the if-condition that triggers the return of a null value simply defines that BachA,
StravinskyA, and MozartA are mutually exclusive, as are BachB , StravinskyB , and
MozartB .
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Considering the acceptability function, we create the following updated utility func-
tions:
u′A(acts) =

null, if : length(acts) 6= 2 ∨
length(set(BachA, StravinskyA,MozartA) ∩ set(acts)) 6= 1∨
length(set(BachB , StravinskyB ,MozartB) ∩ set(acts)) 6= 1∨
StravinskyB ∈ acts;
6, else if : acts = (BachA, BachB);
4, else if : StravinskyA ∈ acts;
3, else if : acts = (MozartA,MozartB);
1, otherwise.
u′B(acts) =

null, if : length(acts) 6= 2 ∨
length(set(BachA, StravinskyA,MozartA) ∩ set(acts)) 6= 1∨
length(set(BachB , StravinskyB ,MozartB) ∩ set(acts)) 6= 1∨
StravinskyB ∈ acts;
1.1, else if : acts = (BachA, BachB);
4, else if : acts = (MozartA,MozartB);
1, otherwise.
Now, we can run the empathic agent algorithms. The naive algorithm returns Bach for
agent A and Mozart for agent B:
D A NA({u′A, u′B , }, {accA, accB}, ActsA) = BachA
D A NB({u′A, u′B , }, {accA, accB}, ActsB) =MozartB
The resulting utility is 1 for both agents. The lazy algorithm returns Mozart for both
agents:
D A LA({u′A, u′B , }, {accA, accB}, ActsA) =MozartA
D A LB({u′A, u′B , }, {accA, accB}, ActsB) =MozartB
The resulting utility is 3 for agent A and 4 for agent B. The full algorithm returns Bach
for both agents:
D A FA({u′A, u′B , }, {accA, accB}, ActsA) = BachA
D A FB({u′A, u′B , }, {accA, accB}, ActsB) = BachB
The resulting utility is 6 for agent A and 1.1 for agent B.
3.3 JavaScript Implementation
We implemented the running examples in JavaScript14. As a basis for the implementa-
tion, we created a simple framework that consists of the following components:
– Web socket server: environment and communications manager. The environ-
ment and communications interface is implemented by a web socket server that
consists of the following components:
14 The code, as well as documentation and tests, are available at http://s.cs.umu.se/qxgbfi.
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• Environment and communications manager. The web server provides a generic
environment and communications manager that relays messages between agents
and provides the shared value system of acceptability rules.
• Environment specification. The environment specification contains scenario-
specific information and enables the server to determine and propagate the util-
ity rewards to the agents.
– Web socket clients: empathic agents. The empathic agents are implemented as
web socket clients that interact via the server described above. Each agent consists
of the following two components:
• Generic empathic agent library. The generic empathic agent library provides
a function to create an empathic agent object with the properties ID, utilityMap-
pings, acceptabilityRules, and type (naive, lazy, or full). The empathic agent
object is then equipped with an action determination function that implements
the empathic agent algorithm as described above.
• Agent specifications. The agent specification consists of the scenario-specific
information of all agents in the environment, as well as of the current agents’
identifier and type (naive, lazy, or full) and is used to instantiate a specific em-
pathic agent. Note that in the implementation, we construct the utility functions
right away and do not use actions-to-consequences mappings.
The implementation assumes that the specifications provided to both agents agents
and to the server is consistent. Fig. 1 depicts the architecture of the empathic agent
JavaScript implementation for the vehicle scenario. We chose JavaScript as the lan-
Fig. 1: Empathic intelligent: architecture
guage for implementing the scenario to show how to implement basic empathic agents
using a popular general-purpose programing language, but concede that a more power-
ful implementation in the context of MAS frameworks like Jason is of value.
4 Reasoning-loop Architecture
We create a reasoning-loop architecture for the empathic agent and again assume a two-
agent scenario to simplify the description. The architecture consists of the following
components:
14 T. Kampik et al.
– Empathic agent (EA). The empathic agent is the system’s top-level component.
It has three generic components (observer, negotiator, and interactor) and five dy-
namically generated functions/objects (utility function and acceptability function of
both agents, as well as a formalized model of the shared system of values).
– Target agent (TA). In the simplest scenario, the empathic agent interacts with ex-
actly one other agent (the target agent), which is modeled as a black box. Pre-
existing knowledge about the target agent can be part of the models the empathic
agent has of the target agent’s utility and acceptability functions.
– Shared system of values. The shared system of values allows comparing the utility
functions of the agents and creating their acceptability functions, as well as their
actions-to-consequences mappings and utility quantification functions, from which
the utility functions are derived.
– Utility function. Based on the actions-to-consequences mappings and utility quan-
tification functions, each empathic agent maintains its own utility function, as well
as models of the utility function of the agent it is interacting with.
– Acceptability function. Based on the shared system of values, the agent derives the
acceptability functions (as described above) to then incorporate them into updated
utility functions, which it feeds into the empathic agent algorithm to determine the
best possible tuple of actions.
– Observer. The observer component scans the environment, registers other agents,
receives their utility functions, and also keeps the agent’s own functions updated.
To construct and update the utility and acceptability functions without explicitly re-
ceiving them, the observer could make use of inverse reinforcement learning meth-
ods, as for example described by [10].
– Negotiator. The negotiator identifies and resolves conflicts of interests using the ac-
ceptability function models and instructs the interactor to engage with other agents
if necessary, in particular, to propose a solution for a conflict of interest, or to re-
solve the conflict immediately (depending on the level of confidence that the solu-
tion is indeed acceptable). The negotiator could make use of argument-based nego-
tiation (see e.g.: [3]).
– Interactor. The interactor component interacts with the agent’s environment and in
particular with the target agent to work towards the conflict resolution. The means
of communication is domain-specific and not covered by the generic architecture.
Fig. 2 presents a simple graphical model of the empathic agent’s reasoning loop archi-
tecture.
5 Alignment with BDI Architecture and Possible Implementation
with Jason
Our architecture reflects the common belief-desire-intention (BDI) model as based on
[7] to some extent:
– If a priori available to both agents in the forms of rules or norms, beliefs, and belief
sets are part of the shared value system. Otherwise, they qualify the agents’ utility
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Fig. 2: Empathic intelligent: architecture
and acceptability functions directly. In contrast, desires define the objective(s) to-
wards which an agent’s utility function is optimized and are–while depending on
beliefs–not directly mutable through persuasive argumentation between the agents.
– Intentions are the tuples of actions the agents choose to execute.
– As it strives for simplicity, our architecture does for now not distinguish between
desires and goals, and intentions and plans, respectively.
We expect to improve the alignment of our framework with the BDI architecture to
facilitate the integration with existing BDI-based theories and implementation using
BDI frameworks. The Jason platform for multi-agent system development [6] can serve
as the basis for implementing the empathic agent. While simplified running examples
of our architecture can be implemented with Jason, extending the platform to provide
an empathic agent-specific abstraction layer would better support complex scenarios.
6 Discussion
In this section, we place our empathic agent concepts into the context of existing work,
highlight potential applications, analyze limitations, and outline future work.
6.1 Similar Conflict Resolution Approaches
Our empathic agent can be considered a generic and basic agent model that can draw
upon a large body of existing research on multi-agent learning and negotiation tech-
niques for possible extensions. A survey of research on agents that model other agents
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is provided by Albrecht and Stone [1]. The idea of combining a utility-based approach
with acceptability rules to emulate empathic behavior is to our knowledge novel. How-
ever, a somewhat similar concept is presented by Black and Atkinson, who propose an
argumentation-based approach for an agent that can find agreement with one other agent
on acceptable actions and can develop a model of the other agent’s preferences over
time [5]. While Black’s and Atkinson’s approach is similar in that it reflects Coplan’s
definition of empathy (it maintains “a process through which [it] simulates another’s
situated psychological states, while maintaining clear self–other differentiation” [12])
to some extent we identify the following key differences:
– The approach is limited to a two-agent scenario.
– The agent model is preference-based and not utility-based. While this has the ad-
vantage that it does not require reducing complex preferences to a simple numeric
value, it makes it harder to combine with existing learning concepts (see below).
– The agent has the ability to learn another agent’s preferences over time. However,
the learning concept is–according to Black and Atkinson–“not intended to be com-
plete” [5]. We suggest that while our empathic agent does not provide learning
capabilities by default, it has the advantage that its utility-based concept allows for
integration with established inverse reinforcement learning algorithms (see: Sub-
section 6.4).
– The agent Black and Atkinson introduce is not empathic in that it tries to compro-
mise with the other agent, but rather uses its ability to model the agent’s preferences
to improve its persuasive capabilities by tailoring the arguments it provides to this
agent.
6.2 Potential Real-World Use Cases
In this chapter, we exemplified the empathic agent with two simple scenarios, with the
primary purpose of better explaining our agent’s core concepts. These scenarios do not
fully reflect real-world use cases. However, the core concepts of the agent can form the
basis of solutions for real-world applications. Below, we provide a non-exhaustive list
of use case types empathic agents could potentially address:
– Handling aspects of traffic navigation scenarios that cannot be covered by
static rules. Besides adjusting the assertiveness levels to the preferences of their
drivers, as suggested by Sikkenk and Terken [23], and Yusof et al. [26], autonomous
vehicles could consider the driving style of other human- or agent-controlled ve-
hicles to improve traffic flow, for example by adjusting speed or lane-changing
behavior according to the (perceived) utility functions of all traffic participants or
to resolve unexpected incidents (in particular emergencies).
– Mitigating negative effects of large-scale web applications on their users. Ev-
idence exists that suggests the well-being of passive (mainly content-consuming)
users of social media is frequently negatively impacted by technology, while the
well-being of at least some users, who actively engage with others through the tech-
nology, improves [20]. To facilitate social media use that is positive for the users’
well-being, an empathic agent could serve as a mediator between user needs (social
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inclusion) and the business goals of the technology provider (often: maximization
of advertisement revenue).
– Decreasing the negotiation overhead for agent-based manufacturing systems.
Autonomous agent-based manufacturing systems are an emerging alternative to
traditional, hierarchically managed control architectures [16]. While agent-based
systems are considered to increase the agility of manufacturing processes, one dis-
advantage of agent-based manufacturing systems is the need for negotiation be-
tween agents and the resulting overhead (see for example: Bruccoleri et al. [8]).
Employing empathic agents in agent-based manufacturing scenarios can possibly
help solve conflicts of interests efficiently.
– Improving persuasive healthcare technology. Persuasive technology–“comput-
erized software or information system designed to reinforce, change or shape atti-
tudes or behaviours or both without using coercion or deception” [18]–is frequently
applied in healthcare scenarios [11], in particular, to facilitate behavior change. Per-
suasive functionality is typically implemented using recommender systems [14],
which in general struggle to compromise between system provider and end-user
needs [21]. This can be considered as a severe limitation in healthcare scenarios,
where trade-offs between serving public health needs (optimizing for a low burden
on the healthcare system) and empowering patients (allowing for a subjective as-
sessment of health impact, as well as for unhealthy choices to support individual
freedom) need to be made. Hence, employing the empathic agent concepts in this
context can be considered a promising endeavor.
6.3 Limitations
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce empathic agents as a general concept. When
working towards a practically applicable empathic agent, the following limitations of
our work need to be taken into account:
– The agent is designed to act in a fully observable world, which is an unrealistic
assumption for real-world use cases. For better applicability, the agent needs to
support probabilistic models of the environment, the other agents, and the shared
value system.
– Our formal empathic agent description is logic-based. Integrating it with Markov
decision process-based inverse reinforcement learning approaches is a non-trivial
endeavor, although certainly possible.
– In the example scenarios we provided, all agents are identically implemented em-
pathic agents. An empathic agent that interacts with non-empathic agents will need
to take into account further game-theoretic considerations and to have negotiation
capabilities.
– The presented empathic agent concepts use a simple numeric value to represent the
utility an agent receives as a consequence of the execution of an action tuple. While
this approach is commonly employed when designing utility-based autonomous
agents, it is an oversimplification that can potentially limit the applicability of the
agent.
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– Software engineering and technological aspects of empathic agents need to be fur-
ther investigated. In particular, the implementation of an empathic agent library
using a higher-level framework for multi-agent system development, as we discuss
in Section 5 could provide a more powerful engineering framework for empathic
agents.
6.4 Future Work
We suggest the following research to address the limitations presented in Subsection 6.3:
– So far, we have chosen a logic-based approach to the problem in focus to allow for
a minimalistic problem description with low complexity. Alternatively, the prob-
lem could be approached from a reinforcement learning perspective (see for an
overview of multi-agent reinforcement learning: [9]). Using (partially observable)
Markov decision processes, one can introduce a well-established temporal and
probabilistic perspective15. A key capability our empathic agent needs to have is
the ability to learn the utility function of other agents. A comprehensive body of
research on enabling this ability by applying inverse reinforcement learning exists
(for example: [10] and [17]). Hence, creating a Markovian perspective on the em-
pathic agent to enable the application of reinforcement learning methods for the
observational learning of the utility functions of other agents can be considered
relevant future work.
– To better assess the applicability of the empathic agent algorithms, it is important
to analyze its computational complexity in general, as well as to evaluate it in the
context of specific use cases that might allow for performance-improving adjust-
ments.
– To enable empathic agents to reach consensus in case of inconsistent beliefs
argumentation-based negotiation approaches can be applied that consider uncer-
tainty and subjectivity (e.g. [15]) for creating solvers for finding compromises be-
tween utility/acceptability functions. Similar approaches can be used to enhance
utility quantification capabilities by considering preferences and probabilistic be-
liefs.
– The design intention of the architectural framework we present in Section 4 is to
form a high-level abstraction of an empathic agent that is to some extent agnos-
tic of the concepts the different components implement. We are confident that the
framework can be applied in combination with existing technologies to create a
real-world applicable empathic agent framework, at least for use cases that allow
making some assumptions regarding the interaction context and protocol.
– The ultimate goal of this research is to apply the concept in a real-world scenario
and evaluate to what extent the application of empathic agents provides practically
relevant benefits.
15 However, the same can be achieved with temporal and probabilistic logic.
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7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduced the concept of an empathic agent that proactively iden-
tifies potential conflicts of interests in interactions with other agents and uses a mixed
utility-based/rule-based approach to find a mutually acceptable solution. The theoretical
framework can serve as a general purpose model, from which advanced implementa-
tions can be derived to develop socially intelligent systems that consider other agents’
(and ultimately humans’) welfare when interacting with their environment. The exam-
ple implementation, the reasoning-loop architecture we introduced for our empathic
agent, and the discussion of how the agent can be implemented with a belief-desire-
intention approach provide first insights into how a more generally capable empathic
agent can be constructed. As the most important future research steps to advance the
empathic agent, we regard the conceptualization and implementation of an empathic
agent with learning capabilities, as well as the development of a first simple empathic
agent that solves a particular real-world problem.
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